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A recurring question facing managers is how (if at all) to react to competitive actions. In this 
research the authors distinguish between reactions to competing strategic and competing 
tactical actions, different from prior homogeneous definitions of competitive actions. Using a 
unique, single-source dataset of personal selling interactions between firms and customers 
covering fourteen drug categories, the authors shows that substantial differences in reactions 
exist. In particular, strategic actions elicit competitive responses with stronger short- and 
long-term consequences compared to tactical actions. Furthermore, while the decision to react 
to competing strategic actions is always warranted, this is not the case for a substantial 
amount of tactical actions, where firms retaliate with an ineffective marketing instrument, or 
accommodate with an effective marketing instrument. This divide between actions is further 
exacerbated in the strength of the reactions that we observe: stronger or weaker reactions to 
strategic actions occur in line with theoretical expectations, whereas reactions to tactical 
actions often are not. Based on these findings, the authors suggest directions to improve 
decision maker’s reactions to competing tactical actions.  
 










Markets are shaped by the interplay of firms that engage in a seemingly endless series of 
moves and countermoves vying for a favorable position. Successful (or unsuccessful) moves 
directly affect the performance of firms involved (Chen 1996; Porter 1980). It should 
therefore come as no surprise that the market-response literature has a long tradition in 
analyzing the effects of competition on firms involved (see for example Leeflang and Wittink 
1992, 1996, 2001; Nijs et al. 2001; Steenkamp et al. 2005). The insights of these analyses 
inform managerial decision making about the adequacy of actions taken by evaluating their 
short- and long-term outcomes, an important but also challenging task for managers 
(Montgomery, Moore and Urbany 2005). An additional aspect that was not addressed by these 
prior studies is that while all competitive moves carry some weight, some moves may carry 
more weight than others with respect to firm outcomes. The strategy literature characterizes 
this difference by distinguishing between strategic and tactical actions (Chen, Smith and 
Grimm 1992; Porter 1980; Smith et al. 1991; see also Table 1). Strategic actions are initiated 
by higher management and require a significant commitment of resources. Once 
implemented, they have a strong influence on a firm’s future path and are not easily reversed 
(Miller and Chen 1994; Smith et al. 1991). Tactical actions on the other hand require 
relatively low resource commitment, and are implemented by lower and middle (henceforth 
junior) management. They often serve to fine tune strategy, and are more easily reversed once 
implemented (Smith et al. 1991). Assessing the impact and adequacy of actions taken at these 
different firm levels in the face of competition will be our goal in this article. Prior work in 
the marketing-response literature (e.g. Leeflang and Wittink 1992, 1996, 2001; Nijs et al. 
2001; Steenkamp et al. 2005) did not take into account this differentiation and its potentially 
distinct effects on the strength of reactions and their short- and long term consequences (see 
Table 1). On the other hand, the strategy literature does not discern short- from long-term 
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consequences, and often does not consider reaction strength, but only number and timing of 
responses (e.g. Chen 1996; Chen, Smith and Grimm 1992; Miller and Chen 1994; Smith et al. 
1991; see also Table 1). By illustrating that reaction strength is also an important determinant, 
we guide managerial decision making on how to react, and address an open research topic 
(Smith et al. 1991).    
Furthermore, while prior marketing-response research is predominantly focused on 
advertising and price promotions, we extend these findings to personal selling (see Table 1), a 
marketing instrument with an estimated spending in the US alone of $800 billion (Zoltners, 
Sinha and Lorimer 2008). The setting of personal selling is an example where this dichotomy 
is highly pronounced. In this setting, higher management determines the general strategy by 
allocating total brand budgets. This allocation is based partly on own marketing effectiveness, 
sales force size and competitive activity. Increasing or decreasing budgets for certain products 
then corresponds to strategic actions in this setting. Once this allocation has been determined, 
it is communicated to junior managers, who implement the strategy by allocating sales 
personnel to products depending on available budgets. Based on in-the-field feedback, 
deviations from the outlined strategy can occur in order to cater to customer needs or respond 
to activity by competing sales people. This gives rise to tactical actions. For example, 
increasing visits to a customer to promote a certain product knowing that a direct competitor 
visited last week is considered a tactical action. Besides the difference in type of decision 
maker outlined above, we corroborate the differences between action types based on our data 
in Section 4. 
 Given this strategy typology, this article focusses on identifying the differences 
between these actions in terms of effectiveness and firm performance in the face of 
competition. In particular, we make three distinct contributions: First, we show that firm 
reactions to competing strategic actions have stronger short- and long-run consequences than 
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reactions to competing tactical actions. Second, we show that while retaliating (by increasing 
sales force effort) to competing strategic actions is always warranted from a marketing 
effectiveness point-of-view, retaliating to and accommodating (by reducing sales force effort) 
competing tactical actions is often unwarranted. Third, we show that the use of sales 
objectives for junior managers induces a short-term orientation. Consequently, we find that 
their reactions are stronger or weaker counter to theoretical expectations. In addition, their 
reactions decisions are often opposite to those taken by higher management, which are in line 
with a rational long-term strategy.  
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These findings derive from the analysis of a unique, single-source panel of British 
physicians. This representative sample reported detailing calls1 received from pharmaceutical 
firms (sales force effort) and prescriptions for drugs written (sales) covering the period 1987-
2006. We analyze a subset of the data which focusses on 14 different chemical entities, with 
each one having more than one branded drug based on the same molecule on the market. 
Given that it is impossible to separate the effects of competitive actions from differences in 
drug efficacy, by controlling for drug efficacy we are able to study competitive interaction in 
isolation in this setting. Furthermore, the use of single-source data enables the observation of 
all relevant marketing activities of brands within these molecule categories aimed at these 
physicians, and we can also assess the subsequent sales impact on all brands. Using structural 
vector-autoregressive models with exogenous variables (SVARX) in combination with 
impulse response analysis, we obtain firms’ short- and long-term reaction- and sales-
elasticities in the face of competing sales force attacks. We use these elasticity estimates to 
quantify firms’ reaction strength and their associated sales impact, and to investigate the 
impact of theoretically derived set of brand, category and regional characteristics on reaction 
strength. To differentiate between strategic and tactical attacks, we perform these analyses at 
two firm levels: the brand level (strategic) and the brand-regional level (tactical). The use of 
the same modeling approach and variables for each molecule category, and elasticities as our 
unit of measurement, allows us to make between-category comparisons and thus provide 
empirical generalizations (Van Heerde 2005).  
 The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our 
research framework in more detail and provide expectations for the strength of reactions for 
both action types. Furthermore, we use prior research to derive a set of moderating variables 
potentially influencing reaction strength. Section 3 presents our data set in more detail, and 
                                                          
1
 In the setting of the pharmaceutical industry, visits by representatives of a pharmaceutical firm to a physician 
are known as details or detailing calls. Detailing is the major marketing instrument in the pharmaceutical 
industry (e.g. Dong, Manchanda and Chintagunta 2009).  
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explains the analytical methods used. The results of our analysis are provided in Section 4, 
where we provide empirical evidence for the presence of strategic and tactical reactions, 
present results on the strength of reactions for both action types, relate the reaction elasticities 
to the sales elasticities to assess whether reactions were justified and evaluate the impact of 
moderating variables on reaction strength. We discuss our findings in Section 5 and provide 
implications for managers in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 discusses the limitations of this 
study and directions for future research. 
 
2. Research Background 
We investigate the occurrence of reactions of a strategic or tactical attack initiated by an 
attacking brand on a defending brand. We only consider reactions using the same instrument 
(i.e. the sales force) as we do not observe other marketing activities aimed at the physicians, 
such as sampling, journal advertising, and symposium meetings. This is not a severe 
limitation however, as detailing accounts for 90% of marketing activity in Great Britain 
during this period (e.g. Janakiraman et al. 2008).     
In addition to the occurrence of a reaction to an attack, we also consider factors that 
moderate the strength of the reaction if it occurs. Next, we discuss our expectations for the 
strength of reactions on attacks, and provide a rationale and expectations for the chosen 
moderating factors influencing variation in the strength of these reactions based on prior 
research in this area.  
 
2.1 Strategic and Tactical Reactions to Sales Force Attacks 
Prior research distinguishes strategic from tactical actions mainly based on the number and 
the timing of reactions that occur (Chen, Smith and Grimm 1992). As reactions to tactical 
actions are more easily implemented than reactions to strategic actions, their frequency is 
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higher and their implementation is faster (e.g. Ferrier 2001; Smith et al. 1991). However, 
these measures do not take into account the effectiveness of such reactions, which makes it 
impossible to evaluate their consequences. Furthermore, consequences of reactions could 
differ over the time period considered for evaluating the effects. We address both issues here 
by quantifying the strength of reactions using elasticities, allowing us to accurately evaluate 
their consequences by comparing their strengths, and by considering both short- and long-
term effects, allowing us to differentiate between time horizons.   
We expect that reactions to tactical actions have stronger short-term consequences, while 
reactions to strategic actions have stronger long-term consequences. As tactical actions seek 
to fine tune existing strategy, their implementation is quick and requires low levels of 
resources (Chen, Smith and Grimm 1992; Miller and Chen 1994; Smith et al. 1991). Thus, 
their short-term effect should be strong due to their ‘quick fix’ nature. However, their long-
term effect is expected to be limited compared to strategic actions. Such strategic actions take 
longer to implement, but have a greater impact on a firm’s future path (Miller and Chen 
1994). Therefore, we expect strategic decisions to have stronger long-term impact.    
While we are interested in strategic and tactical actions that elicit competitive response, 
prior research on advertising and promotions suggests that the extent to which firms react to 
each other is limited and mostly a short-run phenomenon (e.g. Steenkamp et al. 2005). Not 
reacting seems to be the most common reaction, followed by retaliatory action (increasing 
marketing efforts) and then accommodating behavior (decreasing marketing efforts) (Leeflang 
and Wittink 1996; Nijs et al. 2001; Steenkamp et al. 2005). In this study we extend these 
findings to the field of personal selling.   
 
2.2 Moderating Factors Influencing Reaction Strength 
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Next, we focus on factors that potentially influence the strength of reactions. In selecting 
these factors, we use prior research as a guide and select moderators relevant to our setting 
from this body of work (e.g. Nijs et al. 2001; Ramaswamy, Gatignon and Reibstein 1994; 
Steenkamp et al. 2005). Figure 1 provides an overview of these moderators, and their relation 
to strategic and tactical actions taken by firms. What encompasses these factors is that they 
relate to three concepts from the strategy literature that have been identified as drivers of firm 
actions: awareness, motivation and capability (AMC) (Chen et al. 1992; Chen 1996; Miller 
and Chen 1994). While awareness and motivation serve to describe the relations between 
competing firms, capability captures the strategic or resource endowments that translate these 
relations into actual actions (Chen 1996). We use the AMC framework when we develop 
expectations about the factors that moderate reaction strength, and use the framework to 
synthesize our findings afterwards. In addition, we divide the moderators into three groups: 
Brand-specific factors, category-specific factors and regional-specific factors. The latter group 
is only considered for the analysis of tactical actions (see Figure 1) due to the level at which 
we observe these actions 
 




2.2.1 Brand-Specific Factors 
Market Power of Attacking Brand Market power reflects the strength of the presence a 
brand has in a category. Brands with significant market power often have higher budgets and 
a larger sales force, which makes actions initiated by them more noticeable to competitors. As 
awareness is a necessary condition for reactions to occur (Chen, Smith and Grimm 1992), we 
expect this factor to lead to stronger reactions. Additionally, the threat emanating from an 
attack initiated by a firm with strong market power is larger (Gatignon and Reibstein 1997), 
which motivates competitors to react more strongly (Dutton and Jackson 1987).  
 
Power Asymmetry In line with the findings of Steenkamp et al. (2005), we posit that the 
intensity of reactions depends on the relative power difference between brands. In the setting 
of personal selling, this capability to react is largely determined by sales force size, as it 
dictates how many detailing calls can be made. If the attacking brand has a sales force that is 
much larger than the defending brand, reactions are expected to be weakened due to lack of 
resources to do so (Gatignon and Reibstein 1997). Not only are weaker defenders likely to 
have smaller budgets (reflected in their sales force size) available to retaliate, but such 
defenders could also be faced with the fear of strong retaliation if they do react, making 
reactions less likely (e.g. Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp 1998). Conversely, in the case that 
the difference between the attacking and defending brand is small, defenders are not faced by 
these constraints and we expect stronger reactions to occur. 
 
Branded vs. Generic Drugs After patent expiration, lower-priced variants of branded drugs 
based on the same molecule are allowed to enter the market. These generic drugs rely on price 
as their main marketing instrument, and generally deploy less marketing effort before and 
11 
 
after their introduction to the market2 (Osinga, Leeflang and Wieringa 2011). Given this 
limited attention to marketing using detailing, we expect generic brands to react less to attacks 
of branded manufacturers due to limited motivation to react. Similarly, as manufacturers of 
branded drugs tend to cater to a price-insensitive market segment (e.g. Berndt, Kyle and Ling 
2003), we expect these manufacturers to react less to attacks initiated by generic 
manufacturers. Instead, we expect that they will focus on competition with other branded 
manufacturers, as they serve the same market segment and thus have the motivation to react.    
 
Sales Response Asymmetry The decision which physicians to detail is not made randomly, 
but depends (amongst other things) on the response of physicians to (past) detailing efforts 
(Zoltners and Sinha 2005). Firms often have knowledge about the effectiveness of their own 
marketing (e.g. Dong, Manchanda and Chintagunta 2009; Manchanda, Rossi and Chintagunta 
2004; Montoya, Netzer and Jedidi 2010; Zoltners and Sinha 2005), and in some cases also 
about competitive marketing effectiveness (e.g. Dong, Manchanda and Chintagunta 2009). 
We expect that if the attacker’s marketing effectiveness is greater than the defender’s, then 
defending brands will be less prone to react, as such marketing is likely to be spoiled arms 
(Leeflang and Wittink 1996). Similarly, when this pattern is reversed, the defending brand can 
use its own marketing efforts effectively to counter competitive moves made by the attacker. 
We thus expect the overall moderating effect to be negative. 
 Information about sales response is only incorporated at the level of strategic 
decisions and not at the level of tactical decisions (Dong, Manchanda and Chintagunta 2009), 
due to the data requirements and modeling involved in such decisions (Zoltners and Sinha 
2005). Prior research therefore suggests that sales response asymmetry only affects strategic 
actions. 
                                                          
2
 This does not mean that generic brands do not use detailing at all. In our data, we observe sufficient details 
for generic brands to be able to apply time-series methods. However, the number of details tends to be much 
lower than for branded variants. 
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Competitive Sales Response Attacker In addition to differences in own sales response, the 
cross-sales response can also differ by brand (e.g. Dong, Manchanda and Chintagunta 2009). 
This means that some brands are more receptive to competitive attacks than other brands. 
When an attacking brand induces a high competitive sales response, we expect this attack to 
lead to stronger reactions from the defending brand due to the increased effectiveness of such 
actions (Fischer and Albers 2010), motivating responses. This way, defending brands can 
attenuate the attack. Conversely, when the attacking brand’s sales are not strongly affected by 
competitive detailing actions, reactions from the defending brand will be lower due to limited 
motivation to react. In line with the reasoning above we expect this situation to apply to 
strategic actions, not to tactical actions. 
 
Prescription Persistence Attacker In addition to information received from detailing calls, 
physicians also utilize their own experiences when writing prescriptions (e.g. Camacho, 
Donkers and Stremersch 2011; Ching and Ishihara 2012). Repeat prescriptions of the same 
drug can lead to habit formation, which is also known as inertia, loyalty or persistence 
(Janakiraman et al. 2008). If physicians show persistence towards a certain brand, they are not 
affected by competitive detailing ( Janakiraman et al. 2008). For a defending brand, reacting 
to a competitive attack from a brand whose customer base shows a high degree of persistence 
would not increase sales, as the physicians (in this customer base) do not readily switch their 
prescribing behavior under the influence of detailing. Hence, one line of reasoning would say 
that reactions are less strong when the customer base of the attacking brand has a high degree 
of persistence, because defending brands would want to avoid spoiled arms (Leeflang and 
Wittink 1996). On the other hand, a substantial threat could emerge when a brand that is 
successful in building a customer base of persistent physicians initiates an attack. In order to 
avoid loss of sales, defending brands would be motivated to react strongly. Thus, reactions 
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could also be stronger when physicians in the attacker’s customer base show strong 
persistence. We leave this issue open, to be answered empirically. In line with prior 
reasoning, we expect this situation to apply to strategic actions only, and not to tactical 
actions. 
 
2.2.2 Category-Specific Factors 
Category Concentration Economic theory suggests that the larger the number of firms active 
in a category, the lower are prices and margins. In categories with few competing firms, 
margins are higher and price competition is less likely (Ramaswamy, Gatignon and Reibstein 
1994), and instead firms switch to non-price competition such as advertising (Lipczynski and 
Wilson 2001). We therefore expect that in high concentration categories (fewer firms), firms 
will retaliate strongly using their salesforce. Conversely, reactions using the sales force are 
expected to be weaker in categories with more active firms (lower concentration categories).  
 
Category Growth In the literature there is mixed evidence, both theoretically and 
empirically, about the effects of category (market) growth on competitive reactions. On the 
one hand, in categories with little growth, competitive actions quickly lead to a zero-sum 
game, motivating and intensifying competitive reactions by the defender to avoid loss of sales 
(Aaker and Day 1986; Smith et al. 1992). On the other hand, high category growth can 
indicate future profits, motivating firms in these categories to invest extra and react more 
strongly to preserve their position (Gatignon, Weitz and Bansal 1990). This mixed evidence is 
also present empirically, with Ramaswamy, Gatignon and Reibstein (1994) finding stronger 
competitive reactions using the sales force in high growth markets, while competitive 
reactions using price promotions and advertising appear to be weaker in high growth markets 
(Ramaswamy, Gatignon and Reibstein 1994; Steenkamp et al. 2005). Given this mixed 
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evidence, we do not form a-priori expectations about the direction of the effect of category 
growth, for both strategic and tactical reactions. 
 
Detailing Intensity Similar to advertising and price-promotion intensity (Nijs et al. 2001; 
Steenkamp et al. 2005), we consider detailing intensity as a variable that moderates reaction 
strength. Economic theory proposes that the greater the sensitivity of demand to advertising, 
the greater the effectiveness of advertising is and the greater should be the advertising budget 
(Dorfman and Steiner 1954; Leeflang et al. 2000). We expect that a similar relationship 
applies to the sales force resource, and that in categories where the elasticity of detailing is 
higher, the intensity of detailing will also be higher. In turn, given the higher effectiveness of 
detailing in these categories, competitive reactions with sales force will also be stronger. In 
addition, if some firms are successful in using detailing, other firms might be motivated to 
follow and thus strategies converge (Saunders et al. 2000), strengthening and possibly even 
escalating competitive reactions (Metwally 1978). However, we expect that this effect will 
only be present for strategic actions. The allocation of budgets to marketing instruments is a 
decision taken by higher management when deciding on the overall strategy. Once the 
decision to use a sales force has been taken, all junior managers can do is operate within the 
boundaries of this decision. 
 
2.2.3 Regional-Specific Factors 
Physician Concentration For sales people active in areas where physicians are located close 
to each other, it is easier to visit multiple physicians than when these physicians are located 
further away from each other (Dong, Janakiraman and Xie 2014). As this holds for sales 
people from the attacking and defending brand, frequent interactions between sales people 
take place and knowledge about competitors’ activity is observed, increasing awareness of 
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competitor’s efforts. As a consequence, we expect that stronger tactical reactions will occur in 
these areas, because junior managers will respond to increased competitive activity in order to 
achieve their own sales goals, and avoid loss of sales to competitors.  
 
Population Level In areas with a higher population level the potential market size is higher. 
Therefore, increased sales in such areas are easier to achieve compared to areas with lower 
population levels. As such high population areas are more attractive for firms from a sales 
point-of-view as it is easier to achieve a good return-on-investment, we expect that firms in 
these are areas are more motivated to compete and competition is fiercer, and therefore 
reactions to competitive attacks will be stronger. In addition, sales goals for these areas might 
be set higher to reflect the ease with which sales can be generated, which leads to an 
additional motivator for junior managers to do well compared to their peers in other areas, 
strengthening their reactions to competitive attacks. 
 
Income and Education Level The sales potential of a market can be categorized by the 
underlying patient base that demands a certain drug. In markets with higher potential, 
managers and sales people are likely to realize the importance of a market to a firm. In turn, 
competitive intensity in such markets is likely to increase, and reactions to competitive attacks 
will be stronger. Because health status is difficult to measure, we use income and education 
level as proxies for health status (e.g. Geronimus and Bound 1998). We expect higher levels 
of income and education to relate to a better health status, thus reducing demand for drugs  
and therefore lowering competitive reactions due to reduced motivations compared to markets 
where the demand for drugs is higher.  
 An overview of our expectations can be found later on in Table 7. We expect the 
absence of some effects due to the unavailability of information to decision makers (e.g. sales 
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response information for tactical moves) or due to the inability to measure the variables at the 
desired level (i.e. regional factors). Furthermore, due to mixed evidence from the literature, 
we do not formulate expectations for all moderators, but leave them as empirical questions 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
We obtain our results using a unique single-source panel data set of 1502 representative 
British physicians covering the years 1987-2006. Over this period, these physicians 
recorded all the new prescriptions3 they wrote as well as the detailing visits by 
pharmaceutical companies they received on a daily basis. We thus have a complete view 
of the sales and personal selling activity by all brands active in the category.  
The 14 molecules on which we focus cover three therapeutic classes, namely 
hypertension (9), stomach ulcers (3) and analgesics (2). For these therapeutic classes, the 
different drugs marketed using the same molecule are substitutable, but substitution 
between categories is not possible. This is a unique feature of the dataset which derives 
from firms agreeing to co-market a molecule to share marketing costs4 (see Ching and 
Ishihara 2012 for a prior application). In Appendix A we provide more detail on these 
drugs used in the analysis. In addition to the branded variants, a generic is also present. 
The advantage of the co-marketing setting is that we control for differences in drug 
efficacy which can influence the prescription rate of drugs. If one drug is more efficacious 
than another, the prescription rate for this drug will increase due to other factors than 
                                                          
3
 These are actual prescription decisions, as repeat prescriptions have been excluded from the dataset. 
4
 Being in a co-marketing agreement does not mean that the firms do not compete with each other, which 
would go against anti-trust laws. In the data this is confirmed in two ways. First, most physicians are visited by 
representatives from multiple manufacturers, and all manufacturers are active in all regions of Great Britain. 
Thus, we do not find evidence for market division in our data. Second, we observe a substantial amount of 
brand switches within each category despite the molecules being the same. Such switches seem to point to 
detailing effects, which are positive on average (Kremer et al. 2008). Hence, brands are actively and 
successfully trying to influence physicians to change their prescription behavior.    
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detailing activity. Given the impossibility of accurately measuring efficacy of different 
drugs due to side effects, tolerance dosage etc., controlling for efficacy allows us to study 
competitive reactions driven by sales force attacks in isolation.  
For our analyses, we aggregate the prescription and detailing data to the quarterly 
level, as this is the level on which decision making takes place (Dong, Manchanda and 
Chintagunta 2009). We obtain two sets of time series by aggregating across physicians in 
two ways: one set at the brand level reflecting strategic actions, and one set at the brand-
regional level reflecting tactical actions. The regions used are based on the locations of the 
physicians recorded in the data set and correspond to the eleven NUTS-1 regions for 
Great-Britain (Eurostat 2014). This way, we can enrich our data with statistics from 
Eurostat and the National Health Service (NHS) to obtain regional characteristics. While 
these regions may not correspond exactly to the sales regions used by individual firms, 
they are disaggregate enough to capture differences in regional characteristics (population 
size, ethnicity, urbanization, number of physicians, sales force size etc.) to reflect 
differences normally encountered in such regions (e.g. Dong, Janakiraman and Xie 2014; 
Stremersch, Landsman and Venkataraman 2013; Zoltners and Sinha 2005).    
 
3.2 Obtaining Reaction and Sales Elasticities 
Our analysis continues in two stages. In the first stage, we apply structural vector 
autoregressive models with exogenous variables (SVARX) in combination with impulse 
response analysis to the sales and detailing time series to obtain the short- and long-term 
reaction elasticities characterizing the strength of competitive reactions, and their 
associated own- and cross-sales impact. We perform this analysis twice for each drug, at 
the brand level and at the brand-regional level for each region. In the second stage, we 
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regress the estimated reaction elasticities on our set of moderating variables to explain 
differences in reaction strength for both types of strategies. 
 Instead of vector autoregressive models with exogenous variables (VARX) as used in 
prior studies (e.g. Nijs et al. 2001; Steenkamp et al. 2005), we rely on structural vector 
autoregressive models with exogenous variables (SVARX) . The reason for this lies in our 
objective to obtain elasticities using impulse response analysis applied to our estimated 
models. Wieringa and Horváth (2005) show that elasticities based on VAR models 
computed in these prior studies do not match with the formal definition of elasticities, and 
they provide an alternative approach to compute elasticities based on SVAR models, 
which we utilize here. More details on the method are provided in Appendix B.  
 In our SVARX specification, we follow previous work and analyze only two brands 
per molecule category simultaneously to avoid overparametrization (Nijs et al. 2001; 
Srinivasan et al. 2002; Steenkamp et al. 2005). That is, we specify a four-equation 
SVARX model with the log-transformed number of prescriptions (Rx) and the log-
transformed number of detailing calls (Det) as endogenous variables for two brands i and 
j. We estimate the model for all possible combinations of i and j depending on the number 
of brands included in a molecule category in our data. In addition, we add a trend (t) and 
seasonal dummies (SD) as exogenous controls. Depending on unit root and cointegration 
tests, we specify the model in levels or first differences, and add a cointegration term if 
required. For identification purposes, we disallow immediate own effects for all 
endogenous variables. Furthermore, we disallow the immediate effects for the number of 
prescriptions on the competing number of detailing calls, as these feedback effects take 
time to materialize due to the decision making process. For the most common case in our 





























































56~	8(0, Σ). In case of level stationary series, the   
parameters become zero. In case of unit-root series, we replace the endogenous variables 




2', and we add an error 
correction term in case a cointegrating relation is found. We determine the lag length K by 
estimating the model for different lag lengths, and selecting the model with the lowest 
Bayesian Information Criterion (Schwarz 1978).   
 After model estimation, we derive impulse response functions (IRFs) to operationalize 
a competitive attack and trace its effects over time on the all the variables in the system 
(see e.g. Dekimpe and Hanssens (1999) for a technical overview of IRFs, and Wieringa 
and Horváth (2005) for a description of the specific procedure used here). Standard errors 
for these IRFs are derived based on a bootstrap procedure (see Srinivasan et al. 2004 for 
technical details). A competitive attack is operationalized as a one-unit shock to the 
attacking brand’s detailing series, i.e. the attacker increases its sales force effort	. 
Following the procedure in Appendix B, we obtain three types of elasticities. In particular, 
the effect of the competitive attack of brand i on the detailing variable  of brand j 
characterizes the reaction elasticity: the extent to which the defending brand reacts by 
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adjusting its own sales force effort	. Furthermore, the effect of this attack on	, the 
number of prescriptions of brand j, characterizes the cross-sales elasticity, while the effect 
of the attack on	, the number of prescriptions of brand i, is referred to as the own-sales 
elasticity. These elasticities summarize the average reaction of brand j to competitive 
attacks by brand i, and also provide the average sales effects of such an attack. Hence, we 
do not analyze actual individual attacks and their reaction as was done in previous work 
(e.g. Chen, Smith and Grimm 1992; Miller and Chen 1994; Smith et al. 1991), but study 
the average effects of these competitive attacks over the entire time frame covered by the 
model. 
 We summarize the IRFs in line with previous work (e.g. Nijs et al. 2001; Steenkamp et 
al. 2005) into two statistics: the net effect over a dust-settling period, capturing the short-
term effect, and the convergence value, capturing the long-term effect. The dust-settling 
period is defined as the time until four consecutive periods for which the IRF does not 
differ from the convergence value. The short-term effect is then defined as the total effect 
over the dust-settling period. In the case of stationary time-series, the convergence value is 
zero, while in the case of non-stationary time-series this value is non-zero. These two 
summary statistics helps us quantify the short- and long-term consequences of reactions to 
strategic and tactical actions, and their associated impact on own- and competing-sales 
gives us insight on the firm performance implications and justifiability of competitive 
reactions. Finally, to investigate what determines differences in reaction strength, we use 
the reaction elasticities obtained from the IRFs in a second-stage analysis. 
 
3.3 Determining Differences Between Strategic and Tactical Reaction Strength 
To explain the differences in reaction strength between strategic and tactical reactions, we 
link the reaction elasticities to our set of moderating variables defined before. This yields 
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four models: two models categorizing the differences in reaction strength between short-
term and long-term effects for strategic reactions, and two models categorizing the short-
term and long-term effects for tactical reactions. The dependent variables in these models 
are the short- and long-term reaction elasticities obtained from IRFs. We link these 
dependent variables to  the moderators using weighted least squares regression, because 
our dependent variables are estimated quantities (see Saxonhouse 1976 for a justification 
hereof, and e.g. Frison et al. 2014; Nijs et al. 2001; Steenkamp et al. 2005 for applications 
in marketing). As weights we use the inverse standard error of the dependent variable. We 
operationalize our moderating variables in accordance with prior studies; see Table C1 in 
Appendix C for an overview. We compute the brand-specific factors at the brand level for 
the analysis of strategic reactions, and at the brand-regional level for the analysis of 
tactical reactions.  
 
4. Results 
Before presenting our results in detail, we first provide empirical evidence supporting the 
existence of strategic and tactical actions in our data. Next, we discuss our findings for 
each type of reactions observed (no reaction, retaliation or accommodation), and their 
associated strength, for both action types. We then discuss the sales impact of these 
reactions, and whether these reactions were justified or not from a firm performance point 
of view. Finally, we discuss the drivers of differences in reaction strength for both 
reaction types. 
 
4.1 Existence of Strategic and Tactical Reactions 
Besides the differences in terms of decision maker depending on the firm level 
investigated (brand vs. brand-regional) outlined before, based on prior research we can 
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derive some other conditions that set apart strategic from tactical actions. First, as strategic 
actions require more effort to implement and their effectiveness remains uncertain for a 
longer period of time (Wernerfelt and Karnani, 1987), the responses to strategic actions 
will be slower compared to tactical actions (Chen, Smith and Grimm 1992).  The 
implementation lag is reflected in the number of lags we require to accurately fit a 
SVARX model. For strategic actions, the average number of lags is significantly higher 
than for tactical actions (2.20 vs. 1.64, p = .09) In addition, based on a high frequency 
spectral analysis5, we find that cycles for strategic actions are on average longer than those 
for tactical actions (2.90 vs. 2.69, p = .07). Both these findings are in line with prior 
research suggesting that strategic actions take longer to implement, and our data reflect 
this assertion.  
Second, prior research also suggested that strategic actions should provoke fewer 
responses than tactical actions, because responding to strategic actions takes more time 
and requires more effort (Chen, Smith and Grimm 1992). In our case, the absolute number 
of responses to tactical actions is higher by construction (816 elasticities vs. 94 
elasticities). On the other hand we find that a larger proportion of strategic actions (than 
tactical actions) have a significant impact (0.39 vs 0.24, p < .01). Given the more 
influential nature of strategic actions on firm direction (Miller and Chen 1994), this 
increased impact provides validity to the distinction we make here. Furthermore, this 
illustrates that considering the strength of reactions as done in this study instead of the 
absolute number of reactions provides a different view than that provided by prior studies, 
and thus adds to our understanding of competitive interactions. 
4.2 Nature and Strength of Strategic and Tactical Actions 
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Based on the results of the SVARX and IRF analysis, we classify reactions as retaliatory 
(positive, significant elasticities), accommodating (negative, significant elasticities) or no 
reaction (non-significant elasticities). We present the results of this classification for both 
short- and long-term reactions in Table 2. In line with prior studies (Nijs et al. 2001; 
Steenkamp et al. 2005), we find that for the short-run effects, no reaction is the most 
prominent behavior observed for both strategic (60.6%) and tactical (75.7%) actions. 
When a reaction takes place, retaliation is the most common action (39.4% and 15.2% 
respectively). Additionally, we find that accommodation does not take place for strategic 
actions. This can be interpreted, as accommodation at the firm level would imply category 
withdrawal, which we do not observe in our data. When we consider the strength of 
reactions, we find that retaliatory strategic actions have stronger short-term effects than 
tactical actions (1.89 vs 1.17, p < .01).  
For the long-run effects we find that no reaction is most observed for both strategic 
(98.9%) and tactical (97.9%) actions. Again only retaliatory actions are observed for 
strategic actions; no accommodation occurs. For tactical actions both retaliation and 
accommodation take place, but only to a limited extent. In terms of reaction strength, 
strategic actions have stronger long-term effects than tactical actions (3.30 vs 2.566). 
 Combined with our previous findings for the short-term effects, this suggests that 
strategic actions provoke stronger reactions on the short- and the long-run compared to 
tactical actions. This contrasts with our prior expectations, where we expected strategic 
actions to have stronger long-term effects, while tactical actions would have stronger 
short-term effects. As an explanation for this finding, we offer the following: Given the 
higher resource cost and associated commitment strategic actions signal (Chen, Smith and 
Grimm 1992; Miller and Chen 1994; Smith et al. 1991), they invoke stronger reactions 
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due to the increased threat emanating from them (Dutton and Jackson 1987). In contrast, 
because tactical actions have less far reaching consequences in general, reactions are 
weaker in these cases because the threat is smaller. Hence, it is the type of action and its 
potential consequences instead of its time horizon that motivates reactions. In addition, 
higher uncertainty or risk averseness of junior management can also explain why we find 
that tactical actions evoke weaker reactions, as junior managers do not want to risk 
unjustified actions (e.g. Basu et al. 1985; Lal and Staelin 1986; Wernerfelt and Karnani 
1987). 
 
Table 2 Size and Percentage of Significant Reaction Elasticities for Strategic Actions 
(Top Panel) and Tactical Actions (Lower Panel) 
Size (Percentage) of Significant Reaction Elasticities for Strategic Actions 
 Not significant
*
 Retaliation Accomodation  
Short-run NA (60.6 %) 1.89 (39.4 %) NA (0.0 %) 
Long-run NA (98.9 %) 3.30 (1.1 %) NA (0.0 %) 
    
Size (Percentage) of Significant Reaction Elasticities for Tactical Actions 
Short-run NA (75.7%) 1.17 (15.2 %) -1.16 (9.1 %) 
Long-run NA (97.9%) 2.56 (1.1 %) -3.47 (1.0 %) 
* Elasticities are classified based on the sign and significance of the estimates 
 
4.3 The Performance Implications of Strategic and Tactical Reactions 
Having quantified the strength of reactions, we next discuss the performance implications 
of both action types.  We are mainly concerned with the justifiability of an action, as this 
determines whether the actions should have been taken in the first place or not. 
Consistently making wrong decisions can have severe consequences, especially in the 
case of strategic actions that are difficult to reverse. Due to the limited number of 
significant long-term effects found previously, we only focus on short-term effects here.  
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We first consider the case of no reaction in Table 3. We find that not reacting for 
both strategic and tactical actions is usually the correct action, as the most common 
occurrence is the absence of a significant cross-sales effect - 32 out of 57 cases, or 56%, 
for strategic actions and 506 out of 617 cases, or 82%, for tactical actions. In addition, 
positive cross-sales effects are present for the remaining 25 (44%) strategic actions and for 
74 (12%) of the tactical actions. Negative-cross sales effects are absent for strategic 
actions, and occur only in 37 (6%) of the tactical actions. Not reacting to competitive 
moves hence is a justified decision in the vast majority of the cases, either because sales 
are unaffected or because sales are actually gained despite not reacting. Only in a small 
amount of cases for tactical actions do we find harmful negative cross-sales effects when 
not reacting. Risk aversion of junior managers (e.g. Basu et al. 1985; Lal and Staelin 
1986; Wernerfelt and Karnani 1987) can play a role in these latter cases, where the fear of 
taking an unjustified action leads to (unjustified) absence of actions. 
 
 Table 3 Performance Implications of Not Reacting 
 Strategic Actions  
(n = 57 out of 94) 
Tactical Actions  
(n = 617 out of 816) 
Positive cross-sales effect 25   74 
No significant cross-sales effect 32 506 
Negative cross-sales effect 0 37 
 
 Next, we consider the consequences of retaliatory behavior, i.e. increasing sales force 
effort in response to increased competitive sales force effort. Table 4 summarizes our 
findings. We find that justified retaliation (i.e. with positive own-sales elasticity) occurs 
more frequently for strategic actions (37 out of 37 cases, 100%) than for tactical actions 
(72 out of 126 cases, 57%). Given the higher risks involved with strategic actions, this is a 
reassuring finding. In addition, for all these strategic actions the cross-sales elasticity is 
also non-negative. This implies that the retaliation is highly effective in all the cases 
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considered, and is strong enough to counter the sales loss as indicated by the positive sum 
of own- and cross-sales elasticities. 
For tactical actions, 43% (54) of the actions are spoiled arms (Leeflang and Wittink 
1996) due to the negative own-sales elasticity. While the costs of failure are relatively low 
in this case, the repeated use of ineffective actions can still add up and lead to a sizeable 
waste of resources. We thus find evidence here that for a substantial amount of actions 
taken by junior management the decision taken is not optimal given the circumstances. 
Our findings are more optimistic if we consider the cases where the own-sales elasticity is 
positive. In 69% (50) of these cases the reaction is also strong enough to counter the attack 
as reflected through a non-negative sum of own- and cross-sales elasticity.  
 
Table 4 Performance Implications of Retaliation 
 Strategic Actions 
(n = 37 out of 94) 
Tactical Actions 
(n = 126 out of 816)  
Own Elasticity Defender > 0 37 72 
Cross-elasticity < 0         0  28 
Cross-elasticity ≥  0 37  44 
Own + Cross-elasticity < 0         0           22 
Own + Cross-elasticity ≥ 0 37  50 
Own Elasticity Defender ≤ 0 0 54 
 
 Finally, we discuss the consequences of accommodating behavior, i.e. reducing sales 
force effort in response to increased competitive sales force effort. Such an action is 
warranted in the face of a non-positive sales impact of own sales force effort. Our findings 
are presented in Table 5. As noted before, we do not observe any accommodation 
behavior for strategic actions.  For tactical actions we find that accommodation occurs in 
9% (73) of the total cases. In 43 out of these 73 cases, or 59%, accommodation is not 
warranted as the own sales elasticity is positive. However, the sum of own- and cross-
sales elasticity is non-negative in 25 out of these 43 cases (58%), indicating that a sales 
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loss is mitigated. In these cases, a brand profits from market expansion due to increased 
competitive detailing efforts (e.g. Fischer and Albers 2010).  While not directly harmful to 
sales, the firm does miss out on an opportunity to create a competitive advantage by using 
an effective marketing instrument in these cases (Porter 1980). Therefore, a more sound 
response from a sales maximizing point-of-view – which junior managers have given their 
sales objectives (e.g. Zoltners, Sinha and Lorimer 2012) – would have been possible.  
 
Table 5 Performance Implications of Accommodation 
 Strategic Actions 
(n = 0 out of 94) 
Tactical Actions 
(n = 73 out of 816)  
Own Elasticity Defender > 0 NA 43 
Cross-elasticity < 0 NA          8 
Cross-elasticity ≥ 0 NA 35 
Own + Cross-elasticity < 0 NA          18 
Own + Cross-elasticity ≥ 0 NA          25 
Own Elasticity Defender ≤ 0 NA 30 
 
4.4 Moderators of Reaction Strength of Strategic and Tactical Actions 
Having assessed the performance impact of both action types, we conclude with an 
investigation of factors that influence the strength of competitive reactions. Knowledge hereof 
can assist managers in determining what types of reactions to expect from certain competitors, 
and help them improve their strategic and tactical planning. We present the results for the 
short-term effects in Table 6. As the number of insignificant long-term reactions was large, 
there were no significant moderating relations, and we only focus on the differences in 
reaction strength on the short-run. Furthermore, for effects where we expected directional 
effects, we report one-sided tests. A comparison between our expectations and our findings 
can be found in Table 7. 
First, we consider moderating effects affecting the strength of reactions to strategic 
actions. We find that the larger the market power of the attacking brand, the stronger the 
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reaction by the defender becomes (b = 4.442, p < .01). Hence, in line with our expectations, if 
a brand with a strong market presence increases its detailing effort, the visibility of such an 
action coupled with an increased threat will attract stronger responses by competing brands. 
In contrast with our expectations, we find that a larger difference in power asymmetry also 
increases competitive strategic reactions (b = 0.058, p < .01). An explanation could be that 
firms with larger sales forces also attract more attention when making a competitive move, or 
that firms feel compelled to react given the threat posed by those with larger sales forces 
(Dutton and Jackson 1987). An alternative explanation could be leader-follower behavior by 
the defending firm, where the follower with a more limited sales force/budget relies on signals 
of the leader to determine when to increase marketing efforts in a certain category. When the 
attacking brand is a generic, reactions by competitors are weaker (b = -3.824, p < .01). 
Similarly, when the defending brand is a generic, reactions are also weaker (b = -1.001, p < 
.01). Hence, most competitive activity takes place between manufacturers of branded drugs 
that compete for the same type of physician, and branded manufacturers react less strongly to 
generic manufactures and vice versa due to their different positioning within the market, 
which is in line with our expectations.  
Larger differences in own sales response lead to reactions that are weaker (b = -0.071, 
p < 0.10), which is in line with our expectations. If the detailing of the attacking firm is more 
effective than that of the defending firm, the defending firm will react less strongly as such an 
action would be ineffective. Conversely, when the defending firm’s detailing is more effective 
than that of the attacking firm, it will react more strongly to competitive attacks. In contrast, 
differences in competitive sales response and the average physician persistence of the 
attacking brand do no lead to significant differences in reaction strength. At the category 
level, and in line with our expectations we find that weaker reactions occur in categories with 
more competing firms (b = -0.886, p < .05). The diminished motivation to react using sales 
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forces in the presence of more firms is the reason for these weaker reactions. Finally, for 
category growth and detailing intensity we do not find any significant effects. 
Next, we consider differences in reaction strength for tactical actions. Market power 
does not lead to an increased response in this case as expected, nor does power asymmetry 
influence reaction strength for tactical actions. In contrast with our expectations and with our 
findings for strategic actions, we find that tactical actions are stronger when the attacking 
brand is a generic brand (b = 0.748, p < .10) or when the defending brand is a generic brand 
(b = 0.396, p < .10). These results suggest that as junior managers have sales objectives to 
meet, they react strongly to any threat to these objectives. This includes attacks from generics, 
which could be perceived as more threatening due to their price positioning. Similarly, those 
managing generics try to achieve their own sales goals as well and react strongly to all other 
competitors.  
 
Table 6 Effects of Moderating Variables on Strategic and Tactical Reaction Strength for 
Short-Term Reactions 
 Strategic Actions  Tactical Actions 
Moderator Parameter  t-value  Parameter t-value 
Market Power Attacker 4.442a 6.852  -0.609 -0.979 
Power Asymmetry  0.058a 5.126  0.026 0.797 
Attacker Generic -3.824a -9.285  0.748d 1.606 
Defender Generic -1.001a -3.762  0.396c 1.849 
Sales Response Asymmetry -0.071c -1.867  0.002c 1.880 
Competitive Sales Response Attacker 0.099 1.258  -0.0005 -0.461 
Physician Persistence Attacker 0.008 0.095  0.002 0.612 
Category Concentration -0.886b -3.411  0.572a 3.081 
Category Growth 8.725 1.055  0.406a 7.193 
Detailing Intensity -0.293 -0.659  -0.109 -0.436 
Physician Concentration    3.169b 1.981 
Population Level    0.0002d 1.560 
Income    0.00003 0.668 
Education Level    -2.313a -3.785 
Intercept 5.646a 4.980  2.116d 1.547 
a
 = p < 0.01 (two-sided)    c = p < 0.10 (two-sided) 
b




We find that larger differences in response to detailing lead to stronger reactions (b = 
0.002, p < .10). This contrasts with our expectations, where we expected no effect, and our 
finding for strategic actions, where we found a negative effect. An explanation for not finding 
a null effect could be that junior management – through interactions with the sales force – is 
able to infer response to detailing based on whether physicians are willing to receive sales 
calls of the focal firm compared to other firms. If other firms are better able to make sales 
calls, their sales response could be inferred to be higher. The positive effect we find can be 
explained by the sales objectives which junior managers have. In an effort to achieve these 
objectives and despite the reduced inferred efficiency of more sales calls, they increase their 
effort in order to try and offset potential sales losses. In contrast, we find that the competitive 
sales response of the attacker and prescription persistence do not to lead to differences in 
reaction strength.  
In less concentrated categories tactical reactions are stronger (b = 0.572, p < .01). In 
categories where more firms are active, junior managers face increased competition to reach 
their own sales objectives. Hence, they react more strongly to competitive moves in order to 
maintain a sufficient share of category sales (Armstrong and Collopy 1996). Category growth 
also leads to more aggressive tactical reactions (b = 0.406, p < 0.01), in line with the findings 
of Ramaswamy, Gatignon and Reibstein (1994). They attribute this to the heavy investments 
firms make in growing markets to secure future profits. For tactical actions specifically, an 
explanation for this finding could be the use of market share (i.e. sales objectives relative to 
competitors) as a performance metric for junior management (Armstrong and Collopy 1996). 
In growing markets, retaining market share requires increasing marketing effort to maintain 
share-of-voice, and thus we observe stronger reactions in this case (e.g. Metwally 1978). 
Detailing intensity does not affect the strength of reactions, in line with expectation that the 
decision which marketing instrument to use is a strategic decision and not a tactical decision. 
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Reactions to tactical actions are stronger in areas with a higher concentration of 
physicians (b = 3.169, p < .05), confirming our expectation that frequent interactions between 
rival firms increase competitive responses. In areas with a higher population level reactions 
are also stronger (b = 0.00002, p < .10), confirming our expectation that firms prioritize these 
areas. Finally, we find that for the determinants of health status, only education level, affects 
the intensity of competitive reactions, in a negative way (b = -2.313, p < 0.01). In line with 
our expectations, in areas where this determinant of health status is larger, firms expect fewer 
sales to be generated due to the better health status of inhabitants, and therefore focus their 
efforts on areas with more sales potential, reducing competitive reactions. 
 
Table 7 Comparison of Findings with Expectations 









Brand Specific Factors:     
 Market Power Attacking Brand + + + n.s. 
 Power Asymmetry - + - n.s. 
 Attacker Generic Brand - - - + 
 Defender Generic Brand - - - + 
 Sales Response Asymmetry - - 0 + 
 Competitive Sales Response Attacker + n.s. 0 n.s 
 Prescription Persistence ? n.s. 0 n.s 
Category-Specific Factors:     
             Category Concentration + - + + 
             Category Growth ? n.s. ? + 
             Detailing Intensity + n.s. 0 n.s 
Region-Specific Factors     
             Physician Concentration NA NA + + 
             Population Level NA NA + + 
             Income NA NA - n.s 
             Education Level NA NA - - 
Note: A + indicates that reactions are (expected to be) stronger, a - indicates that reactions are (expected to be) 
weaker, a 0 indicates that no effect is expected, a ? indicates that the direction of the effect is not specified a-priori, 





Firms continuously engage in competitive interactions with other firms and this determines 
firm performance. To succeed in this competitive game, knowledge of the expected strength, 
direction and consequences of competitive reactions are required. In this article we examine 
the short- and long-term differences between two types of actions: Strategic actions and 
tactical actions. The former are actions implemented by higher management that determine 
the general strategy, require a large resource effort to implement and are difficult to reverse 
(Miller and Chen 1994; Smith et al. 1991). The latter are actions implemented by more junior 
managers that seek to fine-tune the general strategy, require less resource commitment and are 
more easily reversed (Smith et al. 1991). We empirically explore differences between these 
competitive actions in the setting of the pharmaceutical industry using the sales force as a 
marketing instrument. Using a unique, single-source panel dataset consisting of 1502 British 
physicians and covering twenty years of prescriptions and detailing data in combination with 
time-series methods (i.e. SVARX models) we quantify the short- and long-run strength and 
sales impact of both types of competitive actions, and provide insight on factors moderating 
reaction strength.   
 Our findings suggest that not reacting is the most common behavior in the short-run 
for both types of actions, while significant long-term reactions are almost completely absent. 
Both findings are in accordance with prior research on advertising and promotions (e.g. 
Leeflang and Wittink 1996; Steenkamp et al. 2005). When reactions are retaliatory in nature, 
we find that both in the short- and long-run, strategic actions tend to elicit stronger reactions 
than tactical actions. This is consistent with Dutton and Jackson (1987) who posit that the 
higher threat of strategic actions provokes stronger responses from competitors. In contrast, as 
tactical actions have less far-reaching consequences, their threat is lower and accordingly we 
find that the strength of competitive responses is also lower.  
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Knowledge about the effectiveness of past actions can assist in decisions to implement 
new actions. If we consider the sales impact of strategic and tactical actions, we find that not 
reacting was a sound decision in all of the cases for strategic actions and in 94% of the cases 
for tactical actions. In the cases where a firm opts for retaliation in response to a strategic 
action, we find that warranted retaliatory behavior occurs in all of the cases, and the strength 
of the reaction is strong enough to offset the sales loss due to the competitive attack. 
However, we also find that 43% of the retaliatory tactical actions are spoiled arms (Leeflang 
and Wittink 1996), as they have a negative effect on own sales. Hence, while the decision to 
retaliate taken by higher management is always justified, this is not the case in almost half the 
cases for decisions taken by junior management.   
Accommodating actions are absent for strategic actions. We attribute this to the fact that 
accommodation in this setting would be akin to category withdrawal, which we do not 
observe in our data.  In 59% of the cases for tactical actions accommodation is unnecessary 
because the own-sales elasticity is positive. While in 58% of these cases the loss of sales is 
compensated by primary category growth due to competitive detailing (e.g. Fischer and 
Albers 2010), an opportunity to create competitive advantage is foregone and a more justified 
course of action would have been possible. In the next section we detail some remedies for 
this. 
We also provide insights on when to expect stronger and weaker reactions in response to 
strategic and tactical actions. For strategic actions, we find that reactions by the defending 
firm are stronger when actions are more noticeable or threatening due to the attacker being a 
major player in the category (both in terms of market share and sales force size). Reactions to 
strategic actions are weaker when the attacking or defending brand is a generic, when the 
effectiveness of attacker’s detailing is larger and when the category is less concentrated. 
Tactical actions are stronger when the attacking or defending brand is a generic, when the 
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difference in effectiveness of detailing is larger, when the category concentration is lower, 
when the category growth is higher, when there are more physicians in an area and when the 
population level in an area is higher. When the education level in an area is higher, reactions 
to tactical actions are weaker. These results illustrate that there are clear differences in the 
drivers of decision making between strategic and tactical actions. Strategic actions are driven 
by a mix of awareness, motivational and capability factors, while tactical actions are almost 
exclusively driven by motivational factors and do not take into account capabilities (Chen 
1996). These different drivers lead to moderators showing opposite signs depending on the 
firm level investigated, i.e. strategic actions are weaker when the attacking or defending brand 
is a generic, when the difference in effectiveness of detailing is larger and when category 
concentration is lower, while tactical actions in these cases show stronger responses. While 
our findings for strategic actions largely agree with our expectations, the findings for tactical 
actions often run counter to expectations, and we observe stronger reactions even when this 
does not seems logical from a rational long-term firm performance perspective. We attribute 
these finding to the sales objectives that junior management tries to achieve, stimulating a 
short-term orientation (e.g. Zoltners, Sinha and Lorimer 2012). The implications hereof will 
be discussed in the next section.  
 
6. Managerial Implications 
Our study highlights the presence of strong reaction effects to competitive actions at different 
organizational levels. At the higher management level, given the importance of strategic 
actions for firms as indicated by the strong competitor responses we find, careful strategic 
planning is required to be successful in the competitive game. However, this planning is 
usually absent from manager’s minds due to lack of competitor information and uncertainties 
when predicting behavior of competitors (Montgomery, Moore and Urbany 2005). Managers 
35 
 
can use the findings in this paper on factors influencing competitive reactions to obtain 
expectations of reactions given their market situation. In addition, model-based decision 
support tools can assist in the strategic planning process by making the effects of competition 
and its consequences explicit (e.g. Dong, Manchanda and Chintagunta 2009; Manchanda, 
Rossi and Chintagunta 2004; Montoya, Netzer and Jedidi 2010).  
 At the junior management level, we find that retaliatory and accommodating reactions 
to competing tactical actions are frequently unwarranted. To improve decision making, 
additional training and coaching of regional managers can be an effective tool (Armstrong and 
Collopy 1996; Zoltners, Sinha and Lorimer 2012). Expanding the information available upon 
which to base decisions could be another way to assist junior managers make better decisions 
(Leeflang and Wittink 1996). For example, firms could make the same decision support tools 
that higher management uses available across the firm (Zoltners, Sinha and Lorimer 2012). 
Our finding that the use of sales goals as incentive structure for junior managers can 
negatively influence the decision making process by stimulating a short-term orientation 
suggests that an alternative incentive structure might be required as well. Moving away from 
the outcome-based control system implied by setting sales objectives and moving towards a 
behavior-based control system that emphasizes the selling process instead of its outcomes can 
be an effective way to do so and improve sales force performance (Anderson & Oliver 1987; 
Cravens et al. 1993). 
 
7. Limitations and Future Research 
Our research has some limitations that could not be addressed within the scope of this study. 
First, our data are limited to 14 categories with 2-4 brands per category, while studies with 
comparable methodology (e.g. Frison et al. 2014; Nijs et al. 2001; Steenkamp et al. 2005; Van 
Heerde et al. 2013) relied on the data richness of scanner data in the consumer packaged 
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goods setting to obtain their results with a number of brands exceeding 200. Additionally, as 
data for other industries than the pharmaceutical industry was unavailable to us, we are unable 
to generalize our findings to other settings were personal selling is used, such as military 
recruiting and industrial and media selling (Albers, Mantrala and Shridhar 2010). Future 
research that expands our work using a larger sample over varying industries could provide 
more comprehensive generalizations of our findings. 
 Second, we only have data available on detailing activity by pharmaceutical firms. 
Other instruments such as sampling, journal advertising, symposium meetings and direct-to-
consumer advertising7 have all been shown to affect prescriptions (e.g. Janakiraman et al. 
2008; Osinga, Leeflang and Wieringa 2010; Stremersch, Landsman and Venkataraman 2013), 
and controlling for these additional instruments could influence our findings. However, given 
that detailing accounts for a large share of marketing activities in Great Britain in this period 
(90%, Janakiraman et al. 2008), the effects of this omission are likely to be small.  
 Third, we do not observe drug prices, which are a major differentiator between generic 
and branded drugs and can affect their prescription behavior. However, Gonzalez et al. (2008) 
show that only 17% of physicians switch their prescriptions to generic drugs due to price, and 
other studies suggest that physicians are not price sensitive (Leeflang and Wieringa 2010) 
and/or generally unaware of prices (Kolassa 1995). Additionally, in Great-Britain agreements 
between the National Health Service (NHS) and the pharmaceutical industry fix prices for 
most drugs, effectively eliminating most price competition between manufacturers (National 
Health Service, 2014).   
 Finally, we only focus on reactions within the same molecule category. However, 
pharmaceutical firms often have a portfolio of drugs that are simultaneously promoted (e.g. 
Zoltners and Sinha 2005). Increased competitive activity in one category could lead a firm to 
                                                          
7
 We note that direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) is not allowed in Great-Britain, the market we study. 
However, it is allowed in the United States and New Zealand, and could therefore influence prescriptions and 
spending on other marketing instruments in these markets 
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shift focus to a different category, foregoing a reaction in the same category. Alternatively, 
retaliation could take place in a different category where the defending firm has a stronger 
presence. Within the scope of this study we are not able to investigate such multicategory 
competition as we do not observe the same firms competing in multiple categories in our 
dataset. However, given the strategic implications of such multicategory actions (e.g. 
Jayachandran, Gimeno and Varadarajan 1999; Yu and Cannella 2013), this seems a promising 
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Appendix A Detailed Overview of Categories 
 
Table A1 Overview of Molecule Categories Included in the Study 




Amlodipine Istin, Generic Hypertension 17,114 7,209 
Bisoprolol Monocor, Emcor, 
Generic 
Hypertension 4,084 3,372 
Captopril Acepril, Capoten, 
Generic 
Hypertension 9,607 5,686 
Cimetidine Tagamet, Dyspamet, 
Galenamet, Generic 
Stomach ulcers 31,096 3,123 
Diltiazem Tildiem, Caldicard, 
Adizem, Generic 
Hypertension 6,763 3,123 
Felodipine Plendil, Generic Hypertension 5,001 1,548 
Indomethacin Indocid, Flexin, 
Imbrilon, Generic 
Analgesics 13,745 1,661 
Isosorbide Coronitro, Elantan, 
Cedocard, Generic 
Hypertension 5,385 2,236 
Ismn Ismo, Monit, Imdur, 
Generic 
Hypertension 13,756 3,859 
Lisinopril Zestril, Carace, 
Generic 
Hypertension 15,606 6,189 
Naproxen Naprosyn, Synflex, 
Nycopren, Generic 
Analgesics 45,879 2,059 
Nifedipine Adalat, Coracten, 
Generic 
Hypertension 21,800 5,730 
Omeprasole Losec, Generic Stomach ulcers 30,851 6,150 













Appendix B Computing Elasticities Based on Level-IRFs for Log-specified VAR Models 
Our approach to obtain elasticities differs from earlier work in this field (e.g. Nijs et al. 2001; 
Steenkamp et al. 2005).  In these prior studies, elasticities are calculated by accumulating the 
values of the impulse response function (IRF) applied to a log-specified vector autoregressive 
(VAR) model, and reporting the resulting values as elasticities. However, Wieringa and 
Horváth (2005) show that the results of this method do not agree with the definition of 
elasticity, and propose an alternative method based on work by Ariño and Franses (2000). In 
particular, their method relies on a log-specified structural VAR specification for which level-
IRFs are computed (e.g. instead of giving the change in log-sales in response to a shock, the 
method gives the level sales change). We apply their method in the following way: Let X 
denote the variable being shocked (i.e. the detailing series of the attacking brand), and let Y 
denote the variable for which we want to analyze the effect of the shock (e.g. the detailing 
series of the defending brand if we want to compute reaction elasticities). The method of 
Wieringa and Horváth (2005) yields two simulated time-series over the period for which we 
compute the IRF: ?@denotes the level series had the shock not occurred, and ?denotes the 
level series for which the shock did occur. The IRF is normally computed as the difference 
between those series. We use these two series to compute the following arc elasticity (e.g. 
Trusov, Bucklin and Pauwels 2009): 
ABCD = E∑GH2∑GI∑GI J E KLMKJ, 
where <Ldenotes the mean level of X, and Δ<denotes the change in X (i.e. the size of the 
shock, one unit in this case). The first part of this equation reflects the percentage change in Y 
over a period (i.e. the dust-settling period for short-term elasticities or the entire period for 
which we compute the IRF for long-term elasticities), while the second part reflects the 
percentage change in X. This way, we obtain elasticities that are consistent with the definition 
of elasticity.   
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Appendix C Operationalization of Moderating Variables 
 
Table C1 Operationalization of Moderating Variables 
 Operationalization 
Brand Specific Factors:  
 Market Power Attacking Brand Average share of prescriptions of the attacking brand 
(Gatignon, Weitz, Bansal 1990) 
 Power Asymmetry Difference in average detailing calls between attacking 
and defending brand (Steenkamp et al. 2005) 
 Attacker Generic Brand Dummy variable, 1 if the attacking brand is a generic 
brand, 0 otherwise  
 Defender Generic Brand Dummy variable, 1 if the defending brand is generic  
brand, 0 otherwise 
 Sales Response Asymmetry Difference in standardized own sales response 
parameters between attacking and defending brand, 
based on sales response model (see Appendix D) 
 Competitive Sales Response Attacker Standardized competitive sales response parameter of 
attacking brand, based on sales response model (see 
Appendix D) 
 Physician Persistence Standardized persistence parameter of the attacking 
brand, based on sales response model (see Appendix D) 
Category-Specific Factors:  
             Category Concentration Number of brands in category (Nijs et al. 2001; 
Steenkamp et al. 2005) 
             Category Growth Mean of the first difference of log-transformed quarterly 
prescriptions (Steenkamp et al. 2005) 
             Detailing Intensity Proportion of detailing calls relative to the number of 
prescriptions in the category (Lipczynksi and Wilson 2001) 
Region-Specific Factors  
             Physician Concentration Average number of physicians per 1000 inhabitants over 
the sample period, based on NHS data 
             Population Level Average number of inhabitants per km
2 
over the sample 
period, based on Eurostat data  
             Income Average income in euros over the sample period, based 
on Eurostat data 
             Education Level Average percentage of inhabitants with tertiary 









Appendix D Sales Response Model Description 
As firms have knowledge on the response of physicians to their own own (e.g. Zoltners and 
Sinha 2005) and competitive (e.g. Dong, Manchanda and Chintagunta 2009) marketing 
effectiveness, the decision to react and the subsequent strength of the reaction is influenced by 
this knowledge. To capture these sales response effects, we calibrate a brand-level choice 
model to obtain the own- and competitive-sales response of a brand, as well as the physician 
persistence of that brand (e.g.  Janakiraman et al. 2008). Following Gonül et al. (2001) and 
Manchanda, Xie and Youn (2008), we assume that the utility of physician i to subscribe brand 





We allow +, to vary over brands only, as we are interested in the average brand effect and not 
in the individual physician effect which is used to assign detailing calls (e.g. Manchanda, 
Rossi and Chintagunta 2004). We assume that 3
, follows a type 1 extreme value 
distribution, which yields a prescription probability for brand k at prescription occasion t of 
O
, 	= 	 exp	(
,6 +,)1 + ∑ exp	(
6 +)T  
The model is cast in a hierarchical Bayesian framework (e.g. Manchanda, Xie and Youn 
2008), and we specify 
+, =	+ + U, 
where U,~8(0, VW). The model is estimated using the Stan software package (Stan 
Development Team 2014). We use several variables to explain physician choice behavior, 





,	 = +, + +',
, +	+,XYZ[.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ℎ`]
, + +,`a^. b`^. X`cc
,
+ +d,8Y. X`cc
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, represents the logarithm of the number of detailing calls8 received for brand k, 
and measures the response to the focal brands marketing efforts. We specify the variable in 
logarithms to capture diminishing returns to scale (e.g. Dong, Manchanda and Chintagunta 
2009). Similarly, XYZ[.
, captures the logarithm of the number of detailing calls for all 
competing brands in the category, which measures the sensitivity of the focal brand to 
marketing efforts by other brands. O]^. ℎ`]
, measures the share of prescriptions a 
physicians has written for brand k. We use this as our measure of physician persistence, 
capturing the loyalty a physician has towards a brand. As the timing of detailing calls is also 
important (see e.g. Mizik and Jacobson 2004), – a detailing call made further in the past will 
have less influence than a more recent detailing call – we control for the timing of calls using 
the variables `a^. b`^. X`cc
, and `a^. b`^. XYZ[. X`cc
,. These variables represent 
the number of days that have passed since the last focal and competitive detailing call, 
respectively. In case no detailing calls have been made (yet) to the physician, the indicator 
variables 8Y. X`cc
, and 8Y. XYZ[. X`cc
, capture this for the focal and competing brands 
respectively.  
 As the attribution of detailing calls to physicians is not random, but for example based 
on the past number of prescriptions written by a physician, endogeneity of detailing calls 
could be an issue (e.g. Manchanda, Rossi and Chintagunta 2004). We therefore check for 
endogeneity following the procedure in the Web Appendix of Montoya, Netzer and Jedidi 
(2010) by dividing physicians into deciles according to their total number of prescriptions, 
and comparing the average number of detailing calls received for three groups consisting of 
                                                          
8
 We add a 1 to the number of detailing calls made to avoid taking the logarithm of 0 in case a physician has not 
received any detailing calls at that prescription occasion. 
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deciles 1-4, 5-7 and 8-10 respectively. We find no evidence that physicians in higher groups 
receive more detailing calls than those in lower groups, in contrast with the findings of e.g. 
Manchanda, Rossi and Chintaguna (2004) and Montoya, Netzer and Jedidi (2010). As an 
additional robustness check, for the first category we also implemented a model based on 
Manchanda, Rossi and Chintagunta (2004), where the number of detailing calls received is 
explicitly linked to the past number of prescriptions written. The results hereof showed very 
little differences compared to our model specification. We therefore do not think that 
endogeneity is an issue in our model specification. In case endogeneity is present, its effects 
are likely to be small based on our findings for the two categories, and the gain in accuracy 
we would get in our parameter estimates would we be outweighed by the prohibitively long 
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